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In general, pure economic loss is understood as economic loss without antecedent harm to 
plaintiff’s person or property. Traditionally, pure economic loss was only a topic of interest in 
the limited number of countries such as Germany, England or the United States. Recently, pure 
economic loss began to be discussed intensively in the context of the harmonization of tort law, 
particularly in Europe. Finding out some common principles and rules regarding pure economic 
loss has been the most essential goal of this discussion. It may be difficult to come up with a 
single, clear-cut solution on this complicated issue. However, it is important to note that almost 
all the jurisdictions are concerned about the possible indefinite expansion of liability and chilling 
effect on the economic activity in a substantially similar manner. This explains various attempts 
to limit the liability for pure economic loss to a reasonable degree regardless of a jurisdiction. It 
may take different forms from nation to nation, yet substances are fundamentally similar. Korea 
is no exception to this. In principle, pure economic loss is recoverable under the open-ended tort 
liability regime under Korean tort law. Since the notion of pure economic loss has generally been 
used as a conceptual tool to deny or limit its recoverability in the jurisdictions where there is no 
comprehensive tort liability regime, this notion was hardly known in Korea. However, Korean 
judiciary also shares the same concern that imposing excessive liability on economic loss in a 
densely intertwined society may lead to excessively cautious society, curbing the scope of 
economic activity for fear of liability. Therefore, Korean judiciary has also been striving to limit 
the liability by using other conceptual tools such as unlawfulness, causation or damage. 
This whole analysis leads to a conclusion that Korean tort law may reach a sensible and 
rational outcome just as other legal jurisdictions, though in somewhat different way and in 
slightly different conclusion. This commonness implies the feasibility of international 
collaborative works in this area of law. Therefore, bringing legal experiences in each nation 
together, discussing the differences and similarities of each approach, and striving to find the 
common foundation on which the doctrine of pure economic loss is based, is truly a meaningful 
task.
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I. Introduction
In general, pure economic loss is defined as economic loss without 
antecedent harm to plaintiff’s person or property.1) Pure economic loss 
includes loss of income suffered by a family whose principal earner dies in 
an accident, loss of production suffered by an enterprise whose electricity is 
interrupted by a contractor excavating a public utility, loss of buyers of 
firms or shares resulting from a negligent misstatement made by the bank 
or the auditor,2) or loss of income suffered by owners of hotels and 
restaurants at the beach that has been severely impacted by an oil spill in 
the near ocean.3) However, loss arising from paying medical treatment due 
to the injury, or loss arising from the damage of property itself is not ‘pure’ 
economic loss, since the loss arises directly from the physical damage on 
person or property. This type of loss is generally called consequential 
economic loss as opposed to pure economic.4)
This notion of pure economic loss has been widely recognized in some 
countries including Germany, England, or the United States in order to 
limit or deny the compensability of economic loss. According to what we 
may call pure economic loss rule, these countries normally reject recovery 
for stand-alone economic loss by a negligently committed act, while 
granting recovery for economic loss that results directly from some other 
kind of injury to physical body or property. However, the term, pure 
economic loss, is rarely recognized and used in Korea. Perhaps most judges 
and practitioners may not be aware of this concept. Even most legal 
scholars, unless they have expertise in this field of law, may not have heard 
of this terminology. Since the term ‘pure economic loss’ itself is quite 
foreign to Korean jurists and scholars, there is relatively few Korean legal 
literature that directly focuses on this issue.5) For the same reason, intense 
1) Bussani and Palmer, Pure economic loss in euroPe 5 (2005). 
2) See Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. AC 465 (1964).
3) The Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989 gave rise 
to this issue. For details on oil spill and pure economic loss, see Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery 
for Economic Loss following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. legal. stud. 1 (1994).  
4) Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 nw. u. l. rev. 49 (2010).
5) See e.g. Sangjoong Kim, Soonsojaesansang sonhaeae daehan chaekimbubjoek gyuyule 
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and in-depth discussions taking place abroad regarding the compensability 
of pure economic loss do not draw enough attention from Korean legal 
academia. 
Yet, this notion is not useless in Korea. In reality, issues substantially 
related to pure economic loss are actually discussed, though in different 
forms. Korean tort law, as in tort law in other jurisdictions, confronts the 
sensitive conflict between the necessity to render a remedy to those who 
suffer from economic loss and the necessity to keep the floodgate shut 
against potential excessive lawsuits seeking for the protection of premature 
economic interests. In order to draw a fine borderline between recoverable 
and unrecoverable economic interests, the notion of ‘unlawfulness,’ 
‘causation’ or ‘damage’ is often used. In short, these conceptual tools 
replace the pure economic loss doctrine in limiting the scope of tort 
compensation to a reasonable degree. Therefore, the rationales underlying 
the pure economic loss doctrine are taken into consideration in Korean tort 
law as well. Accordingly, gaining some comparative perspectives remains 
highly meaningful, even from the Korean stand point of view. For the same 
reason, introducing the approach employed by Korean courts and legal 
academia may play some significant role in the comparative study on pure 
economic loss. 
Against this backdrop, I intend to introduce how Korean tort law deals 
with the issue of pure economic loss in this brief paper. This paper is 
structured as follows. Part II explains the pure economic loss rule in 
Germany, England and the United States, where this notion has been 
widely used. Part III gives a general account of pure economic loss rule 
from theoretical perspective. Part IV provides the general overview on 
Korean tort law, which is an essential prerequisite in understanding Korean 
approach toward pure economic loss. Part V deals with specific cases and 
related doctrines regarding pure economic loss in order to facilitate 
deepened understanding on Korean approach.  Finally, part VI sums up the 
previous discussion and suggests what it implies.  
gwanhan bigyobubjeok gochaleul tonghan ilgochal [A Comparative Study of the Liability for Pure 
Economic Loss], Human rts. and Just., Vol. 328 (2003) (Korean); Taeyoung Yoon, Youngupiickeui 
chimhaewa wibubsung [Infringement on Business Interest and Unlawfulness], civil law Journal, 
Vol. 30 (2005) (Korean).  
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II. Comparative Overview 
Despite the ostensible clarity of the notion of pure economic loss, there 
is discrepancy on the rules governing this notion among jurisdictions. This 
does not necessarily follow the familiar common law/continental law 
divide.6) For instance, Germany, definitely a continental law country, is 
hesitant toward the compensability of pure economic loss, as in common 
law countries like England and America.7) Meanwhile, France, Italy and 
Japan do not recognize the notion of pure economic loss. Korea falls into 
the latter category. The decisive feature of the countries recognizing this 
peculiar notion is that they take a casuistic approach in tort law. 
1. Germany
Germany enumerates the types of torts in German Civil Code 
(hereinafter ‘BGB’) § 823 and § 826. Negligent torts against pure economic 
interests do not qualify any of the requirements under these provisions.8) 
Therefore, pure economic loss is normally not entitled to compensation 
under German tort law. 
This attitude of BGB was based on Roman law tradition as well as 
prevailing opinion among scholars in the 19th century.9) Although there was 
controversy whether or not to adopt a general tort provision as is found in 
French Civil Code § 1382 and § 1383, the First Commission which was in 
charge of drafting BGB in the late 19th century decided to take a different 
approach.10)
BGB § 823 (1) protects people from intentional or negligent act harming 
the life, body, health, freedom, property or other rights of another person. 
6) Francesco Parisi, Liability for pure financial loss: revisiting the economic foundations of a legal 
doctrine, in supra note 1 at 75.
7) James gordley & artHur taylor von meHren, an introduction to tHe comParative 
study of Private law 309 (2006).
8) Id., Vor §823 Rn 14f.
9) See. e.g., BernHard windscHeid, leHrBucH des PandektenrecHts 2, 7tH ed. (1891), § 451, 
455. 
10) James gordley, foundations of Private law 271-272 (2006).
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Pure economic interest does not have its place in this provision. Although it 
is theoretically feasible to categorize pure economic interest as a form of 
‘other rights,’ courts and academia have not accepted this interpretation.11) 
Meanwhile, BGB § 823 (2) states that the breach of a statute that is intended 
to protect other people gives rises to liability, and § 826 goes on to say that a 
person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally damage on 
another person is liable for the damage. Since these provisions do not limit 
the form of rights or interests entitled to protection, even pure economic 
interests are entitled to protection. However, this is only so when there is a 
statute intended to protect pure economic interests or an intentional 
tortious act that is contrary to public policy. In this regard, the 
compensability of pure economic loss is significantly restricted. 
2. England
In England, pure economic loss is normally not recoverable, as in 
Germany.12) In the long-standing common law tradition, one has to have a 
specific cause of action in order to file a tort lawsuit. Traditionally, an 
independent cause of action for the recovery of pure economic loss by 
negligent act was unknown. It was only in the 19th century that an action for 
negligence in general was first recognized. However, whether or not one 
could recover for pure economic loss in negligence action was still not 
obvious. In the late 19th century throughout the 20th century, there were 
several court decisions where compensation for pure economic loss was 
denied.13) The most cited decision in this regard is Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. 
V. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.14) It was a typical blackout case where the 
plaintiff, the factory owner, was deprived of electricity due to the negligent 
act of the defendant who cut the electric cable leading to the plaintiff’s 
11) G. Wagner, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Vol. 5, 
Shuldrecht Besonderer Teil III, 5th ed. (2009), §823, Rn 184.
12) See e.g. w.v.H rogers, winfield and Jolowicz on tort, 15tH ed. 134 (1998). 
13) Cattle v. The Stockton Waterworks Co., [1875] L.R. 10 Q.B. 453; Simpson & Co., v. 
Thomson, [1877] 3 A.C. 279 (H.L.)(U.K.); Anglo-Algerian Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The Houlder 
Line Ltd., [1908] 1 K.B. 659; Morrison Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Greystoke Castle, [1947] A.C. 25, 
280 (H.L.)(U.K.).
14) [1973] 1 Q.B. 27.
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factory in the process of excavating work. The judgment in this case has 
outlined that there are two types of economic loss: economic loss 
consequential on physical damage and pure economic loss. Only the first is 
in principle recoverable. 
However, pure economic loss rule is not without exception. In Hedley 
Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,15) the Court dealt with the case 
where the defendant negligently issued an erroneous statement on the 
financial status of a certain company and the plaintiff suffered economic 
loss by relying on this statement. The Court ruled that the relationship 
between the parties was “sufficiently proximate” as to create a duty of care, 
since the defendant could reasonably have known that the statement might 
be relied on by the plaintiff for entering into a contract of some sort. This 
would give rise to the negligence liability on the defendant even though the 
loss suffered by the plaintiff was purely economic. However, on the facts, 
the disclaimer was found to be sufficient enough to discharge any duty 
created by the defendant’s actions. Anyhow, this decision implies that the 
scope of the compensability of pure economic loss in England has the 
possibility of expansion through broadening of the duty of care.    
3. United States
Like in England, the United States has also established the pure 
economic loss rule that normally denies compensation for pure economic 
loss. The rules in two countries are very similar to each other.16)  
The pure economic loss rule in the United States derives its modern 
authority from Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion in Robins Dry Dock & 
Repair Co. v. Flint,17) wherein the Supreme Court held that a charterer could 
not recover for economic loss resulting from negligent harm to the owner’s 
boat.18) Federal Courts have generally accepted the broad interpretation of 
15) [1964] A.C. 465.
16) Fleming James Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A 
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 vand. l. rev. 43, 45-46 (1972).
17) 275 U.S. 303, 304 (1927). 
18) Rhee, supra note 4 at 50.  
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the Robins, and rejected most of the pure economic loss cases.19) Another 
milestone case in this regard is Ultramares Corporation v. Touche handed 
down in 1932.20) This case, like Hedley in England, concerned the liability 
arising from misstatement. At issue was the liability of the defendant who 
issued a negligent audit statement relied on by the plaintiff. Here, Judge 
Cardozo held that the claim in negligence failed on the ground that the 
auditors owed the plaintiff no duty of care, there being no sufficiently 
proximate relationship. In his reasoning to the conclusion, he expressed his 
concern to “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class.” This contains the core concern against 
compensation for pure economic loss.  
However, a number of states began to allow new forms of claims in 
negligence that eventually led to compensation for pure economic loss.21) 
For example, courts now widely recognize suits by non-client parties 
against “professionals.”22) Scholars have also raised their voices against 
strict limitation on the recovery for pure economic loss. Just to name one, 
Professor Richard Epstein rejected the traditional negligence rule that 
barred recovery for pure economic loss as “both unjust and inefficient.”23) 
Thus, pure economic loss rule is still in the process of formulation in the 
United States. 
III. Theoretical Basis of Pure Economic Loss Rule
At a glance, discussion on pure economic loss looks highly diverse and 
complicated. However, it narrows down to a single question of how one 
should define the scope of compensation in economic interest related tort 
litigations. Corrective justice, perhaps the most important theoretical 
19) For the list of federal court decisions, see Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 
u. ill. l rev. 1573, 1579 n.25 (2008).
20) 174 N.E. 441 (1932).
21) Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle 
Theory”, 50 ucla l. rev. 531, 536 (2002).  
22) Id. at 537.
23) Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. legal 
stud. 477, 502 (1979); quoted from Id. at 573. 
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foundation of tort law, calls for correcting the injustice that the defendant 
has inflicted on the plaintiff. Compensation of loss is a typical remedy 
against the wrong in this regard. However, it is not easy to say what loss is 
compensable and what is not. It is one thing to say that someone suffers 
from certain loss, while it is another thing to say that someone else should 
be held responsible for that loss. The notion of pure economic loss lies at the 
center of this sophisticated issue. It has been used, mainly in Germany and 
common law countries, to represent economic losses that cannot be 
recovered through tort lawsuits. There are several arguments to explain 
how this denial or restriction can be justified.  
1. Floodgates Argument 
In modern societies where so many interests are intertwined with each 
other in a close proximity, a single wrongdoing can make a series of 
negative impact on an endless chain of economic interests. For instance, a 
tortious act against an enterprise inflicting severe economic loss may in 
turn affect economic interests of its creditors, employees, or shareholders. 
Now, they may also have their own creditors, employees or shareholders 
whose interests are subsequently affected by this incident. There might be a 
spouse and children of the employee who are adversely affected as well. If 
these adverse outcomes can be labeled as economic losses, then one might 
say that the wrongdoer should be held liable for all the economic losses that 
would not have occurred if the wrongdoing had not taken place. However, 
imposing limitless liability on the act may chill general activities that people 
or enterprise carry out on a daily basis for fear of legal risks they might 
face. This consequently leads to over-deterrence, resulting in a chilling 
effect on non-negligence conduct.24) For this reason, it is too naïve to say 
that a wrongdoer is responsible for whatever loss he or she has incurred. 
Rudolph von Jhering has eloquently put this concern in the following 
sentences. 25) 
24) David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 ind. l.J. 593, 612 (1986). 
He argues that the line between negligent and non-negligent conduct is not clearly delineated, 
and this may lead to the deterrence of useful activity as well.
25) R. von Jhering, “Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht 
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‘Where would it lead if everyone could be sued, not only for 
intentional wrongdoing (dolus) but for gross negligence (culpa lata) 
absent a contractual relationship! An ill-advised statement, a rumor 
passed on, a false report, bad advice, a poor decision, a 
recommendation for an unfit serving maid by her former employer, 
information given at the request of a traveler about the way, the 
time, and so forth ― in short, anything and everything would make 
one liable to compensate for the damage that ensued if there were 
gross negligence despite one’s good faith ….’     
This fear for “liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate 
time, to an indeterminate class”26) justifies the doctrine of pure economic 
loss. This justification is often cited as “the floodgates argument,”27) 
meaning that the doctrine of pure economic loss functions as a floodgate 
against flood of unlimited and unreasonable liability or flood of lawsuits 
seeking for such remedy. This rationale is not only directed to protecting a 
tortfeasor from excessive liability, but also to providing the general public 
with a certain degree of assurance that they will not run incalculable risk of 
compensating endless chains of economic loss incurring from their 
negligent act.   
 
2. Efficiency Argument
From the perspective of economic analysis of law, pure economic losses 
are not entitled to compensation because they are not social losses.28) At this 
point, one needs to remember that the ultimate purpose of tort law, from 
the law and economics viewpoint, is to minimize total social costs.29) 
zur Perfektion gelangten Verträgen,” JHerings JaHrBücHer 4, 12-13 (1861); quoted from 
gordley & taylor, supra note 7 at 309.
26) Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
27) For example, see Helmut Koziol, Recovery for Economic Loss in the European Union, 48 
arz. l. rev. 871, 875 (2006).
28) Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 
ariz. l. rev. 735, 736-737 (2006). Also see W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 oxford J. legal 
stud. 1 (1982).
29) See generally, Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
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According to this logic, economic harm to one often means economic gains 
to another, thereby not incurring any social costs.30) 
An illustration given by Richard Posner may facilitate understanding of 
this argument.31) Suppose that A owns a store and B is a builder who is 
using a crane for the construction of a building next to A’s store. Through 
B’s negligence, the crane falls on the public sidewalk directly in front of the 
store, blocking the entrance and thereby forcing the store to close until the 
crane is removed and the sidewalk repaired, which might take several 
days. Should A be allowed to Sue B for the profits lost while the store is 
closed? 
Judge Posner explains that the answer given by the pure economic loss 
rule is negative.32) He explains that A’s lost profits are, in the language of 
economics, a ‘private‘ cost rather than a ‘social’ cost.33) A social cost is a 
diminution in the total value of society’s economic goods, while a private 
cost is a loss to one person that produces an equal gain to another.34) In the 
above illustration, A’s lost profits are offset elsewhere and are therefore 
merely a private cost, since A’s customer will shop elsewhere, thereby 
incurring profit to A’s competitor.35) Therefore, A’s pure economic loss 
cannot be compensated. This is not so if the crane has damaged A’s 
property directly where social costs incur. This is not pure economic loss 
and thus compensable.  
However, the above argument supposes certain conditions. In the first 
place, it presupposes perfect market, which is not always in existence in the 
real world. It also presumes that the transition of the customer from A to B 
does not incur any social costs, which may not be the case in a real 
transactional setting. Further, the above argument is based on the idea that 
the purpose of tort law is to minimize the social costs of accidents, as 
70 yale l. J. 499 (1961). 
30) Id. at 737.
31) The illustration is from Id. at 736-737.
32) Id. at 736. Also see, e.g., 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 
750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001).
33) Id. at 736-737.
34) Id. at 737.
35) Id.
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opposed to private costs. Nevertheless, the adequateness of this perspective 
has long been fiercely debated.36) Here, it suffices to mention that the 
persuasiveness of the above argument is dependent on the soundness and 
the feasibility of these presumptions. 
3. Contract-related Argument
Interestingly enough, at least from the viewpoint of civil law scholars, 
the rule of pure economic loss encourages parties to adopt contractual 
solution.37) This rule presupposes the following; contract offers protections 
to pure economic loss while tort law doesn’t.  
In contract law, the contracting parties are subject to liability for pure 
economic loss incurred from the breach of contract by one of parties, as 
long as it has been bargained for in the contract. This is unanimously 
accepted in every jurisdiction including England, United States and 
Germany where pure economic loss is, in principle, not compensable under 
their respective tort laws. 
Then, why does tort law not extend protection to pure economic interest 
while contract law does? Underlying rationale is as follows. Individuals are 
the best judges of their own interests. This is no exception to interests that 
are pure economic. Therefore, the law should encourage people to make a 
contract over pure economic interests whenever they can. By making 
contract, they can optimally design in advance so that the risks of potential 
pure economic loss are duly allocated between them. This reduces the 
uncertainty and enhances efficiency. Denying the compensability of pure 
economic loss by tort law encourages people to negotiate and make a 
contract concerning pure economic loss.38) After all, this attitude presumes 
the primacy of contract over tort law. 
This is sometimes described as the boundary-line function of pure 
economic loss rule. The pure economic loss rule is intended to maintain the 
36) See PHilosoPHical foundations of tort law (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
37) Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ariz. l. rev. 
713, 716 (2006).
38) Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P. 3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007).
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boundary between contract law and tort law.39) By drawing a clear line 
between two areas of law, people are encouraged to handle the issue of 
pure economic loss on their own in the form of a contract, which is far more 
desirable than just leaving the issue to the tort law.  
However, the above argument is valid only in cases where making a 
contract is feasible. In reality, there are a great number of other cases where 
making a contract in advance is nearly impossible. For example, it is nearly 
impossible for an oil carrier company to negotiate in advance with every 
single potential victim over possible pure economic loss that might incur 
from future oil spill. In this regard, the ambit of the above argument 
remains very narrow.  
III. General Overview on Korean Tort Law
1. Open-ended Tort Regime
As I have described above, the approach toward pure economic loss is 
heavily dependent on the approach taken by tort law in respective 
countries. Therefore, one should understand Korean tort regime in order to 
understand Korean approach toward pure economic loss. 
Korean tort law is based on relevant provisions contained in Korean 
Civil Code. As is the case with most continental law countries, this Code 
encompasses vast areas of private law, including the law of property and 
secured transaction, the law of obligation, the law of unjust enrichment, the 
law of torts, and even as far as family and inheritance law. Article 750 – 766 
in the Code deal with various aspects of torts. 
As shown in Article 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code, and in 
Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code, Korean Civil Code also offers a 
general provision providing a comprehensive set of requirements for tort 
actions. The first Article that appears in the tort subsection, Article 750, 
states that anyone who causes losses to or inflicts injuries on another person 
by an unlawful act, either intentionally or negligently, shall be bound to 
39) Level 3 Communications, LLC. v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
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make compensations for damage. It states that the liability for torts require 
four elements; unlawfulness, willfulness or fault, damage and a causal 
connection between the act and the damage.40) This functions as a 
prevailing principle over the whole regime of Korean tort law.
This provision is wide and flexible enough to embrace the protection of 
a variety of legal rights and interests. Korean tort law not only protects 
what we call absolute rights, such as rights of liberty, bodily integrity or 
ownership over property, but also other legitimate interests including 
emotional or economic interests.41) The substantive comprehensiveness, or 
emptiness to put it differently, gives enough room for differentiated judicial 
law-making in the process of adjudicating an individual case.   
The comprehensive tort system, as is witnessed in Korean tort law, 
opens up the possibility of holding the defendant liable for any loss, be it 
emotional or economic. This is in contrast with a casuistic approach in 
common law countries or in Germany. In the first place, the compensability 
of non-pecuniary loss reveals the discrepancy between two approaches. For 
instance, common law countries as well as some civil law countries such as 
Germany, Greece and Netherlands limit the compensability as well as the 
scope of compensation for emotional loss.42) In contrast, there is no limit set 
forth by provision as to the compensability of non-pecuniary loss in Korean 
tort law like in Belgium, France and Spain.43) Same divergence can also be 
observed in the realm of pure economic loss. Article 750 of Korean Civil 
Code does not discriminate pure economic loss from other forms of 
damage arising out of physical injury or direct infringement on property. 
Here, the focus is not on the type of the damage. Rather, the focus is on the 
general requirements set forth by a general tort provision. According to the 
prevailing interpretation of Article 750 in Korea, the requirements for 
constituting a tort action are as follows; intention or negligence, 
40) Besides these requirements set forth in Article 750, Article 753 and 754 presupposes 
the requirement of liability capacity. 
41) Note that Article 750 of Korean Civil Code does not require infringement of ‘rights.’ 
(cf. see Article 709 of Japanese Civil Code). 
42) See W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report of a Project Carried Out By the European Centre 
for Tort and Insurance Law; in w.v.H. rogers (ed.), damages for non-Pecuniary loss in a 
comParative PersPective 246 (2001).
43) Id.
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unlawfulness of the act, and the damage arising out of the act(causation 
and damage). If these requirements are satisfied, whether or not the loss is 
purely economic makes no difference.44)
2.  Key Factors Concerning Pure Economic Loss: Unlawfulness, 
Causation and Damage
Among the above-mentioned requirements, three factors play a key role 
in adjudicating cases concerning pure economic loss. They are 
unlawfulness, causation and damage. Since understanding these concepts 
is essential in understanding decisions regarding pure economic loss, I will 
explain these elements in turn.
1) Unlawfulness
Korean tort law explicitly requires unlawfulness for a tort. However, 
unlawfulness is a highly vague and abstract concept. Unlawfulness is 
generally construed as the state of being in violation of the legal order. In 
many cases, the existence of unlawfulness is easy to clarify since there are a 
great number of statutes that provide concrete, detailed rules and standards 
by which unlawfulness is determined. Yet, there are still many cases where 
no specific norms by which unlawfulness is measured are provided. In 
addition, certain legal provisions from different statutes even collide 
against each other, making it troublesome to determine unlawfulness. 
Further, it is widely accepted among jurists and scholars that the law in the 
context of ‘unlawfulness’ incorporate ‘unwritten law’ as well as ‘written 
law,’ which makes the notion of unlawfulness even more complicated. 
Even when there are clear legal standards by which unlawfulness is 
measured, it is not always easy to apply them to a specific case. In these 
gray areas, a judge has to decide the case relying on his or her notion of 
what the general legal order demands. This usually requires the balancing 
of relevant legal interests. Judges specify legal interests at issue and weigh 
these interests in light of the specific context of the case. This ad-hoc 
approach may impair predictability to a certain degree, but secures 
44) In addition, there are individual legislations that explicitly recognize compensatory 
liability for pure economic loss in specific areas such as unfair competition and antitrust.  
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flexibility that may reach far enough to secure the adequate compensability 
of pure economic loss. 
Some pure economic loss cases call for in-depth deliberation on 
unlawfulness. Intentional interference with contractual relationship is 
perhaps one of the most typical examples of this. Whether or not the 
interfering party is subject to tort liability is heavily dependent on the 
evaluation of the unlawfulness of the interfering act. This is examined more 
in detail later on in this paper. 
2) Causation and Damage
Causation is another tricky concept. To begin with, factual causation is 
required to impute damage to the defendant. However, factual causation 
itself can be extended indefinitely. Theoretically speaking, the chain of 
factual causation can reach as far as the mother’s act of giving birth to the 
wrongdoer. Yet, it does not make any sense to impute the damage to the 
wrongdoer’s mother. Therefore, imposing liability on whoever provided a 
factor with factual causation may lead to ever-increasing scope of liability. 
With this in mind, Korean courts, in striving to define the reasonable scope 
of liability, have been using the notion of ‘adequate causation.’45) According 
to this doctrine, there should be adequate causation between the tortious 
act and the damage. In other words, courts normatively evaluate the 
existence of causation. 
Another concept to look at in this regard is damage. The section 1 of 
Article 393 provides that compensation for breach of contract is allowed for 
‘ordinary damage.’ The section 2 of the same Article goes on to stipulate 
that ‘special damage’ is compensated only if it was foreseeable. Ordinary 
damage is damage that occurred according to the usual course of things. 
On the other hand, special damage is damage that occurred due to the 
unusual specific circumstances. The prevailing opinion interprets Article 
393 in light of adequate causation. They explain that this Article embodies 
underlying rationale of adequate causation. Ordinary damage is damage 
that has adequate causation with the breach. Special damage is deemed to 
45) This notion is believed to have been borrowed from Germany, where it has been used 
in order to limit the scope of compensation to the reasonable degree under total recovery 
principle.    
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have adequate causation only when the breaching party could have 
foreseen it. Historical research reveals that this provision might have been 
influenced by famous Hadley case in England46) via Article 416 of the 
Japanese Civil Code. Interestingly, Article 393 of the Korean Civil Code that 
governs the law of contract is also applied mutatis mutandis to the tort law 
by Article 763. Therefore, this ordinary/special damage divide plays a 
significant role in tort law. 
3. Broad Judicial Discretion on Adjudicating Pure Economic Loss Cases
Unlawfulness, adequate causation, ordinary damage, and foreseeability 
requirement for special damage all function together to limit the scope of 
liability within a reasonable degree.47) These safety valves enable courts to 
exclude some types of economic loss cases, thereby preventing flooding of 
the frivolous cases and excessive liability.
Using these general concepts to deal with pure economic loss, rather 
than employing a separate doctrine for the issue, leads to the possibility of 
broader judicial discretion in tort litigations. In exercising judicial 
discretion, courts strive to balance interests of both parties; on one hand, the 
interest of the plaintiff for a remedy against loss he or she has suffered, and 
on the other hand, the interest of the defendant to pursue economic goal 
without fear of indeterminate and overwhelming liability. Within the 
flexible framework of Korean tort law, courts make evaluative judgments 
based on their policy decisions to come up with sound outcomes. 
It is not certain if Korean judges, in adjudicating pure economic loss 
cases, take economic efficiency into consideration, as the law and economic 
approach suggests. As mentioned earlier in this paper, a key factor in 
determining the optimal economic loss rule is the relationship between 
pure economic loss and social loss, according to the economic analysis of 
law.48) The basic rationale is that economic loss should be compensable in 
46) Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
47) Another floodgate against excessive expansion of the tort liability is the rule that 
damage should be certain, concrete, specific and real in order to be compensated. Mere 
speculative and unripe damages are not entitled to compensation.
48) See Francesco Parisi et al., The comparative law and economics of pure economic loss, 27 int 
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torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss.49) This 
explains the limited recoverability of pure economic loss. However, Korean 
judges do not seem to use the notion of private loss and social loss, at least 
explicitly. Instead, they seem to rely on the notion of corrective justice. That 
is, Korean judges will strive to work out a conclusion that satisfies their 
sense of justice. In this process, the limit will be set forth on the 
compensation for pure economic loss, thereby preventing boundless and 
intolerable expansion of liability. In doing so, judges flexibly use and weigh 
different factors in determining the outcome, as Walter Wilburg has stated 
in his famous idea of a flexible system.50)
The breadth of judicial discretion by utilizing flexible concepts in tort 
law explains the lack of need to expand the contractual remedies to fill the 
gap in Korea. In some jurisdictions where difficulties in embracing pure 
economic loss in the narrow rule in tort law exist, they attempt to expand 
the law of contract, when necessary, in order to provide an adequate 
remedy.51) This is not the case in Korea. Tort law is wide and flexible 
enough to embrace various types of pure economic loss disputes. One of 
the representative examples is the case regarding pre-contractual 
relationship. Instead of extending contractual obligation to the negotiation 
process, Korean courts regard it as a matter of tort when the would-be 
party negotiating for a contract breaks off the negotiation in violation of 
good faith.52) 
IV.  Korean Cases and Legal Doctrines regarding Pure 
Economic Loss
Economic loss can arise in many different forms: interference with 
l rev. l & econ. 29, 37 (2007). 
49) Id. 
50) walter wilBurg, die elemente des scHadensrecHts (1941). 
51) The example of gap-filling contractual remedies is found in Germany where the 
doctrine of Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter (prospective effect of a contract for the benefit of 
third party) has been employed to allow a third party to bring a contract claim against the 
infringer. 
52) See ‘B. Breaking off the Negotiation’ part of this paper for further illustration.
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contractual relationship, an employer deprived of the services of an 
employee; a child losing the financial support of her father; or factories 
suffering from blackout due to the negligent actions during road 
construction that damaged a municipality’s electric cables. A common 
question out of these various types of accidents is if the parties harmed by 
these activities are entitled to compensation for their losses.
Given the diversity of the cases, dealing with every type of pure 
economic loss in this short paper seems unfeasible. For that reason, I will 
introduce four types of cases (including one hypothetical one) - intentional 
interference with contractual relationship, breaking off negotiation, 
blackout, and traffic congestion - to manifest the Korean approach toward 
pure economic loss. 
1. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationship
One of the most frequently disputed types of pure economic loss is 
intentional interference with contractual relationship. 
To begin with, Korean legal doctrines, in principle, rely on the 
distinction between absoluteness and relativity of rights. This refers to the 
idea that there are two types of rights; absolute rights which can be claimed 
against everybody and relative rights that can only be claimed against a 
certain party. For instance, ownership of a thing belongs to the former type 
of rights since it can be claimed everybody, whereas contractual right 
belongs to the latter type of rights since it can only be claimed against the 
other contracting party. According to this doctrine, contractual rights are 
only to be interfered by the other party, but not by the third party outside 
the contractual relationship. 
However, this rule is not always without exceptions. As mentioned 
above, Korean tort law provides a general provision that does not limit the 
scope or type of rights that are legally protected. Contractual rights, though 
not as conspicuous as proprietary rights, are undoubtedly legitimate rights 
worth protecting. In line with this, Korean courts recognize, though 
prudently, the interference with contractual relationship as one of the 
torts.53) 
53) See Supreme Court Decision 4285Minsang129, Delivered on Feb. 21, 1953. This is the 
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In adjudicating this type of tort, courts usually take two values into 
consideration; the need to protect legitimate contractual rights and the need 
to guarantee individual freedom and free competition. These two values 
are seemingly conflicting with each other. However, courts strive to figure 
out a proper solution in each individual case in the midst of this conflict. 
According to the Supreme Court rulings,54) the obligee’s rights are not 
preclusively protected. Thus, the basic rule is that the third party can make 
a contract with one of the contract party even when it may be in conflict 
with the pre-existing contractual right of the other contract party. This is 
reflection of free competition in the area of contract law. However, the 
principle of free competition in transactional affairs presumes fair and 
sound competition within the boundaries allowed by legal order. 
Accordingly, tort is found where the third party knowingly interferes with 
the obligee’s rights by violating the statute or sound social policy and other 
social order, etc. On finding the tortious interference with contractual 
relations, the Court considers contents of obligation, attitude of tortfeasors, 
and existence of intention or intent to prejudice, and decide each case 
individually. The Court also considers economic and social policy factors 
such as freedom of transaction and public interests. Another notable feature 
of the Supreme Court decisions regarding interference with contract is that 
intention plays a key role in recognizing tort. So far, no Supreme Court 
decision ruling in favor of the plaintiff in case of negligent interference is 
found.
Since the liability for interference with contractual relationship is 
decided on an ad hoc basis, the Supreme Court denied liability in some 
decisions,55) while recognizing it in others.56) Below are some notable cases 
where liability was recognized. 
first decision that mentioned the possibility of the tortious interference of contractual 
relationship.
54) See e.g. Supreme Court Decision 2000Da32437, Delivered on Mar. 14, 2003.
55) See Supreme Court Decision 99Da38699, Delivered on May. 8, 2001.
56) See Supreme Court Decision 2004Da55320, Delivered on Sep. 8, 2006.
232 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 10: 213
1) Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Sell 
In this case,57) A, the sole supplier of goods, agreed to grant ‘exclusive 
right to sell’ to B, a seller. According to the contract, A would be in breach 
of the contract if A were to supply items to anyone other than B. B sold this 
exclusive right to C. Therefore, A was to supply goods to B under an 
original contract between A and B, and in turn B was to let C sell those 
goods under the second contract between B and C. In short, if every 
contract was performed soundly, C was to be the final and sole retailer of 
the goods. However, A knowingly supplied goods to a third party. This 
was in direct infringement of the original contract between A and B, 
consequently making it impossible for B to perform his duty to C under the 
second contract between B and C. C brought a lawsuit against A, claiming 
that he has suffered economic loss due to A’s infringement of the 
contractual relationship between B and C. 
The Supreme Court ruled that A’s supply of the goods in breach of the 
contract between A and B also constituted a tortuous action against C, on 
the basis of intentional interference with contractual relationship. The Court 
stated that mere knowledge of the exclusive contract was not sufficient to 
constitute a tortuous interference. Rather the Court stated that intent to 
prejudice or another unlawful intent was required. In this case, according to 
the reasoning of the Court, “A’s act of selling in the open market after the 
grant of exclusive right to sell cannot be anything but improper and 
wrongful.” The Court specifically focused on A’s culpability. In the above 
case, B together with C has warned A several times to stop distributing 
goods to the third party. However, A continued on with its transaction. 
This was also in violation of trademark act, since the items which were not 
to be sold to the third party other than B carried B’s registered trademark. 
These factors altogether were key factors in determining A’s act against C 
as unlawful.
2) Boycott by Civic Organizations Resulting in the Breach of Contract 
Another intriguing case is about a nationwide boycott by civic 
57) Supreme Court Decision 2000Da32437, Delivered on Mar. 14, 2003.
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organization leaders.58) An entertainment company invited a world-famous 
singer, Michael Jackson, to have a concert in Korea. When this plan was 
known to the public, several civic organizations launched a nationwide 
boycott, claiming that having Michael Jackson in Korea would undermine 
the morality of Korean society because he was allegedly involved in child 
sex abuse at the time. They also asserted that minors who were to be the 
prospective audience for the concert would have to pay for expensive 
tickets, and this would eventually lead to the waste of foreign currency. 
Leaders of these organizations declared a boycott against all the companies 
related to this concert. Among them were two commercial banks that have 
been commissioned by the entertainment company to sell concert tickets on 
its behalf. The boycotters warned banks of a possible negative campaign if 
they did not stop selling tickets for the concert instantly. Accordingly, the 
banks repudiated the contract with the entertainment company and 
stopped selling tickets. Therefore, the company had to spend extra costs to 
hire extra persons to sell tickets manually. 
The entertainment company sought compensatory damages against the 
leaders of the civic organizations, claiming that intimidating banks to stop 
selling tickets and causing consequential damages to the plaintiff 
constituted a tort. The Court of First instance denied the claim on the 
ground that the boycott activity was within reasonable boundary of legal 
order and the banks rather voluntarily made a decision to repudiate the 
contract for fear of leaving negative impression to people. This decision was 
also affirmed by the Appellate Court. 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision by the lower courts. 
The Supreme Court especially noted the fact that the defendants 
intentionally interfered with the contractual relationship between the banks 
and the plaintiff. The fact that the defendants allegedly pursued public 
interest through this boycott did not give them a total exemption from the 
liability. They could have used other means to pursue their goal (i.e. 
directing the boycott to the entertainment company or holding a 
demonstration) than to interfere with contractual relationship. 
The appropriateness of the outcome remains disputed. However, in the 
58) Supreme Court Decision 98Da51091, Delivered on Jul. 13, 2001.
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case where it is difficult to draw a line between lawful and unlawful 
boycotts, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court used the criterion 
of ‘intentional interference with contractual relationship’ in affirming 
unlawfulness of the campaign.  
2. Breaking off the Negotiation
Breaking off the negotiation is another economic loss case relating to 
contract. Generally, a contract is formed through negotiation between two 
parties. In light of the freedom of contract, it is totally up to parties whether 
or not to make a contract. Even when the decision of one party to break off 
the negotiation causes economic loss to the other party, this is not per se 
illegal. Therefore, a party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to 
reach an agreement.59) 
However, the Supreme Court suggests that the breaking party may be 
held liable when it is contrary to good faith. To be more specific, if a party 
has incurred economic loss to the other negotiating party by refusing to 
make a contract after he has created proper expectation or confidence to the 
other that the contract will certainly be made, the breaking party is liable 
under tort law.60) This is another form of pure economic case under Korean 
tort law. 
Following is a case in which the Supreme Court held the defendant 
liable under this type of tort.61) The plaintiff in this case was a sculptor. The 
defendant, the Korean Export Association, extended invitations to five 
sculptors including plaintiff to submit a tentative draft for a sculptural 
work commemorating total amount of export reaching l00 billion dollars. 
According to terms and conditions specified in the invitation to make an 
offer, the defendant was to enter into a contract with the successful 
applicant.62) The draft submitted by the plaintiff was chosen by the 
59) See Principles of European Contract Law, Article 2:301 (1).
60) Supreme Court Decision 99Da40418, Delivered on Jun. 15, 2001.
61) Supreme Court Decision 2001Da53059, Delivered on Apr. 11, 2003.
62) In this case, the plaintiff argued that the contract was concluded when his draft was 
chosen by the defendant. On this ground, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable 
for breach of contract. However, court ruled that the invitation made by the defendant toward 
five sculptors was only an invitation to make an offer, since key elements of the contract, such 
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defendant. However, the defendant has been deferring necessary measures 
to conclude a contract with the plaintiff for nearly three years. Finally, the 
defendant entered into a contract with another sculptor contrary to the 
expectation of the plaintiff. The Court ruled that this constituted a tort in 
light of the good faith principle. 
Worth noting is that the Court has adopted tort approach instead of 
contractual approach in dealing with the case. Instead of recognizing some 
sort of quasi-contractual relationship between two negotiating parties, the 
Court chose to apply general tort law.63) This can be possible thanks to the 
comprehensive and flexible tort system in Korea.  
3. Blackout
Blackout refers to the loss of light or power due to a specific accident 
regarding electricity facilities. When this happens, it does not only incur 
damages to the facility itself, but also to people who benefit from electricity. 
The secondary damages include damages that are purely economic. 
Therefore, a blackout case also raises the compensability issue. There have 
been a number of blackout cases in Korea so far. Following is one of them.64) 
In this case, the defendant’s employee was driving a defendant’s truck. 
He drove negligently, smashed into an electric pole. Due to this crash, the 
lower part of the pole was impaired, and this caused blackout in the nearby 
area for approximately 7 hours. The pole was located in a factory complex 
area, where plenty of factories were in operation at the time. Among these 
factories was the factory run by the plaintiff. Since the pole was used in 
delivering electricity to the factory, the plaintiff suffered from this 
unexpected blackout. In the first place, the machine in the factory was 
abruptly stopped and physically damaged. In addition, the plaintiff was 
not able to produce goods for a time being. This also incurred economic 
loss. The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the defendant under Article 760 
as price, time and place of performance, were lacking. Therefore, the acceptance by the 
defendant was additionally required. Unfortunately, it did not actually take place.   
63) This approach is also taken in Supreme Court Decision 2002Da32302, Delivered on 
May. 28, 2004.
64) Supreme Court Decision 94Da5472, Delivered on Dec. 26, 1996.
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of the Korean Civil Code,65) seeking for compensation of his loss. 
It was evident that there was certain amount of damages to the plaintiff. 
The existence of a factual causation between the tort committed by the 
defendant’s employee and the loss suffered by the plaintiff seemed quite 
clear. However, if the above losses were all compensable was still at issue. 
The Supreme Court ruled that damages due to an impaired machine 
and loss to potential profit were special damages, as opposed to ordinary 
damages. According to Article 393, special damages are recoverable only 
when they could have been foreseen by the defendant. In this specific case, 
the Supreme Court held that the physical damages to the machine were 
foreseeable by the defendant’s employee. The Court especially noted the 
fact that the electric pole was located in the midst of the factory complex, 
and inferred that the defendant’s employee could have foreseen destructive 
impact caused by the accident on the machine in the factory that was in 
operation. However, the Court denied the foreseeability of consequential 
economic loss to the business profits that the plaintiff could have gained 
otherwise. The Court held that this economic loss was too remote and 
speculative to be compensated. 
    
4. Traffic congestion 
Although there is no case regarding traffic congestion inflicting 
economic loss, the short analysis of a hypothetical case might be helpful in 
understanding Korean attitude toward this type of tort.  
Let us say that A caused a traffic accident negligently, and it 
consequently blocked the highway. As a matter of course, this accident 
gave rise to severe traffic congestion. B was one of many drivers and 
travelers on the highway who were unfortunately caught up by the traffic. 
At the time, B had an extremely important deal awaiting him. It was certain 
65) According to Article 756, an employer or a master is vicariously liable for the act of an 
employee or a servant. Once a master-servant relationship is proved and the damage has been 
caused by the servant, it is highly improbable that the master be excused of the liability. 
Although the article allows the master to be exempted from the liability by showing either 1) 
he has properly selected and supervised the servant or, 2) the damage would have occurred 
even if he had fulfilled his duties mentioned above, Korean courts almost never accept these 
allegations in practice.  
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that this could bring him the profit of $ 100,000. However, due to the traffic 
congestion, he was late for the deal and was not able to close it in his favor. 
For that reason, the important transaction that could have benefited B, did 
not take place. Now, B is suing A for suffering economic loss of $ 100,000.
From B’s point of view, it would be unfair for him to bear the risk 
incurred by A’s negligent driving. Nevertheless, granting  relief over this 
sort of loss is likely to result in the expansion of liability for the remote 
consequences of a wrongful act. Consequently, it would result in the flood 
of frivolous litigations and, in turn, the shrinking of economic activity for 
fear of bearing unforeseeable risks. It will also hike administrative costs of 
the society as well. Therefore, B is not likely to recover his loss from A, had 
it happened in Korea. Korean courts have several options in dismissing B’s 
claim. It may deny B’s claim for the lack of causation between the traffic 
accident and the B’s failure to close the deal. It may also deny the claim 
stating that the loss does not qualify as ordinary damages, and that A could 
not foresee B’s peculiar circumstance. 
V. Conclusion
Traditionally, pure economic loss was only a topic of interest in the 
limited number of countries such as Germany, England or the United 
States. Recently, pure economic loss began to be discussed intensively in 
the context of the harmonization of tort law, particularly in Europe.66) 
Finding out some common principles and rules regarding pure economic 
loss has been the most essential goal of this discussion. It may be difficult to 
come up with a single, clear-cut solution on this complicated issue. 
However, it is important to note that almost all the jurisdictions are 
concerned about the possible indefinite expansion of liability and chilling 
effect on the economic activity in a substantially similar manner. This 
explains various attempts to limit the liability for pure economic loss to a 
reasonable degree. It may take different forms from nation to nation, yet 
substances are fundamentally similar. Korea is no exception to this. In 
66) See Bussani and Palmer, supra note 1.
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principle, pure economic loss is recoverable under the open-ended tort 
liability regime under Korean tort law. Since the notion of pure economic 
loss has generally been used as a conceptual tool to deny or limit its 
recoverability in the jurisdictions where there is no comprehensive tort 
liability regime, this notion was hardly known in Korea. However, Korean 
judiciary also shares the same concern that imposing excessive liability on 
economic loss in a densely intertwined society may lead to excessively 
cautious society, curbing the scope of economic activity for fear of liability. 
Therefore, Korean judiciary has also been striving to limit the liability by 
using other conceptual tools such as unlawfulness, causation or damage. 
This whole analysis leads to a conclusion that Korean tort law may 
reach a sensible and rational outcome just as other legal jurisdictions, 
though in somewhat different way and in slightly different conclusion. This 
commonness implies the feasibility of international collaborative works in 
this area of law. Therefore, bringing legal experiences in each nation 
together, discussing the differences and similarities of each approach, and 
striving to find the common foundation on which the doctrine of pure 
economic loss is based, is truly a meaningful task.
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